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Torts - Assumption of Risk by Patron at Ice Hockey Match Plaintiff, a patron at an ice hockey match, brought a negligence action
to recover damages for injuries sustained when struck by a flying puck.
Defendant owned the indoor arena, which it had leased for the past
twenty years to private concerns. These lessees promoted ice hockey
games for a profit during the winter months. Plaintiff paid the general
admission fee. There were no reserved seats at the hockey games and
each spectator could elect to sit either behind the goals at each end of
the rink or along the sides of the rink. Plaintiff selected a seat along
the side of the rink. The rink of artificial ice was enclosed by a wooden
fence or "dash" four feet in height. The seats behind the goals were
further protected by wire screening ten to twelve feet in height, because
in shooting for the goals the players were more apt to raise the puck
from off the surface of the ice than at other times during the game.
During the progress of the game the puck, a hard rubber disk one inch
thick and three inches in diameter, was lifted from the ice and, after
clearing the four foot dash, struck the plaintiff. Plaintiff had attended
other ice hockey games at defendant's arena and was generally familiar
with how the game was played. Held: that plaintiff assumed the risk
of injury from the flying puck while attending the hockey game as
a spectator, where she was familiar with the general purpose of the
game and with the surroundings in the arena where the game was
played. Modec v. City of Eveleth, 29 N.W.(2d) 453 (Minn., 1947).
The court in the principal case reasoned that in Minnesota ice
hockey is played to such an extent and its risks are so well known to
the general public that a spectator will be held as a matter of law to
have knowledge of the risk of injury from a flying puck to the same
extent that a spectator at a baseball game is held to have knowledge
of the risks incident to that game. This rule of law and line of reasoning was first enunciated by the New York Supreme Court, which, in
ruling on a similar fact situation, stated :'
"No case has been found which passes upon this exact situation. There are, however, a number of cases where spectators
at baseball games have been injured by batted balls coming into
the stand. The concensus of opinion in those cases is that there
is no liability; that the proprietors of a baseball park are not
obliged to screen all the seats; that spectators occupying seats
that are not screened assume the risk incident to such use.... The
baseball cases seem to present the same legal question that confronts us here."
Thereupon the New York court dismissed the complaint. Later in the
same year, in an action brought by a spectator who was struck by a
'Hammel v. Madison Square Garden Corporation, 156 Misc. 311, 279 N.Y.S.
815, 149 A.L.R. 1181 (1935).
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flying puck while attending her first hockey game at which all the
protected seats behind the goals had been sold out, the same court in
a three to two decision ruled.
"It seems to me that appellant in attending a hockey game
occupied precisely the same status as a spectator at a baseball
game and that the same rules should be applied in each instance.
There was no obligation on the part of respondents to protect
appellant against a danger incident to the entertainment which
any reasonable spectator could foresee and of which she took the
risk. The risk of being hit by a baseball or by a puck at a hockey
game is a risk incidental to the entertainment and is assumed by
the spectators. Any other rule of law would place an unreasonable
burden upon the operator of a ball park or hockey rink .... It is
argued that this was the first time she had ever attended such a
performance. That does not change the rule of liability so far
as respondents are concerned. Certainly it was not incumbent
upon them to make inquiry of each patron on entering the premises as to whether or not he or she had ever witnessed a like
performance."
Prior to the Minnesota decision in the principal case, only one
other jurisdiction supported the New York rule. In a Canadian case,
a minor was denied damages for injuries sustained when struck in the
face by a flying puck when it was shown that he, the plaintiff, was a
hockey player and was fully cognizant of the danger of sitting along
the sides of the rink, and elected to sit there even though there were
vacant seats in the sections protected by the screening behind each goal.
The court stated that the spectator must be held to have a thorough
knowledge of the risks assumed by the public in witnessing games of
3
ice hockey and the protection customary in such games.
Although the case of Ingersoll v. Onondaga Hockey Club Inc.4
is very often cited for its dictum concerning assumption of risk by
spectators at baseball parks, it is not the rule applicable to patrons at
hockey rinks in the majority of jurisdictions. One law review writer
criticizes the New York rule on the ground that while common knowledge of ice hockey and of it incidental dangers might suffice, per se, to
absolve the owner of the rink of negligence and to absolve the spectators
of the charge of contributory negligence, it would not, however, "suffice
for denial of relief on grounds of voluntary assumption of risk, as this
latter doctrine is commonly interpreted." 5 The Massachusetts court
expressly refuted the New York rule and stated: "Cases as they arise
must be decided by the application of general principles to the particu2 Ingersoll v. Onondaga Hockey Club, Inc., 245 App.Div. 137, 281 N.Y.S. 505,
149 A.L.R. 1181 (1935).
sElliott and Elliott v. Amphitheatre Limited, 3 West.Wkly.Rep. 225 (Manitoba), 149 A.L.R. 1172 (1934).
4245 App.Div. 137, 281 N.Y.S. 505, 149 A.L.R. 1181 (1935).
5 10 So.Calif.L.Rev. 67 at 77 (1936).
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lar facts shown and not by arbitrary classification according to the
names of various games." 6 The court reasoned that a patron attending
his first hockey game might well believe that the four foot dash offered
adequate protection, and that if it did not he could assume that the
proprietor would have provided screening along the sides of the rink
similar to that which was provided behind each goal at the ends of
the rink. Four years later the Massachusetts court affirmed its previous
decision in an action brought by a spectator who was struck by a flying
puck as he walked along the aisle to reach the rest room. In that action
it was shown that the flying puck not only cleared the four foot dash,
but also two rows of box seats and another five foot fence before
7
striking the plaintiff.
The Rhode Island court refused to follow the New York rule on
three principal grounds: (1) The three to two decision of the Appellate
Division of the New York Supreme Court had never been reviewed
by the New York Court of Appeals, whereas the Massachusetts rule
was handed down by the highest court of that jurisdiction; (2) Baseball is the national pastime and therefore the community in general
may be presumed to know the dangers incident to the playing of that
game, whereas ice hockey is of more recent origin and is less widely
known as a sport and therefore the dangers thereof have not had time
to become a matter of common knowledge in the community; (3) Baseball is fundamentally different from ice hockey in that the baseball is
pitched through the air to be batted out towards the playing field on
the ground or in the air, according to the skill of the batter or chance,
while in ice hockey the puck is supposed to be driven along the ice
towards the goal at either end of the hockey rink." The California court
partially followed the reasoning of the Rhode Island court when it
stated :9
"The rule which has apparently uniformly been applied to
baseball cases is, we believe, inapplicable to ice-hockey games,
for the reason that the average person of ordinary intelligence
in this country is familiar with the game of baseball, and it is
reasonable to presume that such person appreciates the risk of
being hit by a pitched or batted ball without being specifically
warned of such danger. Hence, a spectator at this nationally
known game may ordinarily be held to assume such a risk.
However, the average person does not have the same knowledge
respecting ice hockey or the risk of being hit by a flying puck
while observing such a game."
6 Shanney v. Boston Madison Square Garden Corp., 296 Mass. 168, 5 N.E. (2d) 1,

149 A.L.R. 1179 (1936).
Lemoine v. Springfield Hockey Ass'n Inc., 307 Mass. 102, 29 N.E. (2d) 716, 149
A.L.R. 1180 (1940).
8 James v. Rhode Island Auditorium Inc., 60 R.I. 405, 199 Atl. 293, 149 A.L.R.
7

9 1180

(1938).

Thurman v. Ice Palace, 36 Cal.App. (2d) 364, 97 Pac. (2d) 999 (1939).
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Three years later a California court ruled that it was a question of
fact for the jury to decide whether an owner of a rink was negligent
in not posting signs or in any other way warning the spectators of the
danger from flying pucks, or in not installing screening along the sides
of the rink.10 In Nebraska a spectator who voluntarily chose a seat
along the side of the rink was held not to have assumed the risk of
being hit by a flying puck as a matter of law. It had been shown that
the injured spectator had attended hockey games during the previous
season but the court ruled :1
"In view of the novelty of the game of hockey in this state,
and the acquaintanceship and experience of appellee with the
game and its incidental dangers. . .we feel that the question of
her knowledge of the game and its dangers, and her entire conduct as it related to the issue of dereliction of duty on her part
is a matter for the consideration of the jury."
Some of the courts which follow the majority rule intimate that
when the sport of ice hockey attains state-wide prominence in their
jurisdiction, the court might then support the rule followed in New
York and Minnesota. Professional ice hockey made its debut in the
United States about 37 years ago. After intensive research one authority concludes: "The first game of ice hockey, which is definitely
called Ice Hockey, was played in Montreal, March 3rd, 1875, at the
Victoria Skating Rink.' 1 2 A promoter endeavored to introduce the
sport into the United States as early as 1897, and although an indoor
rink for hockey was built in Cleveland around 1905, it was not until
1911, when the Pacific Coast League was organized, that professional
hockey was introduced into the United States. "But hockey remained
rather obscure in the United States until Boston, and then New York,
acquired franchises in the National League and international play start' 3
ed, since which time the arenas have bulged with capacity crowds."'
Boston received its franchise in the National League in the winter of
1924-25. Some high schools and colleges in the northern states treat ice
hockey as a major sport. Hockey is also a popular sport for boys, to be
played out of doors in those states where long, cold winters prevail.
It would seem that the New York rule is too severe when it applies
the doctrine of assumption of risk as a matter of law to a spectator
who is attending his first hockey match. However, previous attendance
at hockey games is not a good criterion when to apply the doctrine,
for expert testimony differs as to the frequency with which a puck is
raised off of the ice and sent flying among the patrons during the
10 Thurman v. Clune, 51 Cal.App.(2d) 505, 125 Pac.(2d) 599 (1942).

11 Tite v. Omaha Coliseum Corp., 144 Neb. 22, 12 N.W. (2d) 90, 149 A.L.R. 1164
(1943).
12 Menke, Encyclopedia of Sports, p. 371 (1944).
Ibid., -p. 374.
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course of a game. During some games the puck never flies over the
dash, but during other games this accident might happen four or five
times during the course of play. The New York and Minnesota
courts reason that any danger resulting from the playing of ice hockey
is open and visible, and a spectator need not sit through even one game
to become cognizant of those dangers. The Minnesota decision adds
weight to the New York rule, but it may reasonably be assumed that
the majority rule will continue to be followed in those jurisdictions in
which the sport is less widely known and less extensively played because of shorter winters and/or inadequate arena facilities for indoor
rinks. Ice hockey is receiving wide publicity for being one of the fastest
sports known, and in view of this increased publicity and the general
popularity of all sports during the present decade, the northern states,
including Massachusetts and Rhode Island which at present support
the majority rule, might be expected to adopt the decision enunciated
by the Supreme Court of Minnesota in the principal case.
WILLIAM J. KOELMETZ

